......som forventet, de skal nok nå det sidste stykke af vejen dem der vil. Vi har jo læst om hackere der er kommet ind i det amerikanske forsvar, NASA, osv. så hvorfor skulle dette ikke ske. Egentligt er det som forventet, spørgsmålet har hele tiden været hvornår nogen gjorde det ikke om det kunne gøres, men de er vist ikke nået hele vejen ENDNU!

En påmindelse måske til når vi erhverver VISTA, hvis vi gør, om at intet er sikkert nok. Så kan vi tænke om hvores samfund har det bedre med at gå mere og mere over imod et IT samfund, Terminator og The Matrix er det fremtiden vi har set???? Spøg til siden......eller

...og var der ikke nogen der fandt ud af at man kunne foretage en printscreen af hvert frame (er det betegnelsen?) i filmen og derved foretage en nøjagtig kopi, godt det hul også blev lukket.

Here we go again (Round and round in circles):

"If true, though, the breaking of AACS marks a dark day for providers of high-definition content on next-gen Blu-ray and HD DVD discs. And, it marks a dark day for consumers, too--fair use arguments aside, I imagine that if AACS has been hacked, in the future, we'll pay for this evolution through more draconian security measures than ever before."

http://blogs.pcworld.com/staffblog/archives/003380.html

Så kan der anvendes flere ressourcer på nye teknologier, som forbrugeren betaler for,  og som sikkert igen brydes.

Fra Videobusiness

http://www.videobusiness.com/article/CA6403011.html

Citér: DEC. 28 | LIKE SCROOGE SHOWING up at a holiday party, reports surfaced over the Christmas break that AACS—the supposedly unbreakable encryption used on HD DVD and Blu-ray discs—had in fact been broken, by a hacker calling himself Muslix64. According to the thread he or she started on the Doom9 Forum, Muslix was able to write a Java-based command-line utility for Windows called BackupHDDVD that allowed him to move unencrypted files containing Full Metal Jacket, Van Helsing, Tomb Raider and a handful of other movies to his hard drive. Muslix even posted a video on YouTube, tauntingly titled “AACS is Unbreakable,” purportedly showing the utility in action. He/She then released the source code for others to try, complete with FAQ. The postings set off an orgy of gloating and wild speculation over how the studios might respond to the purported crack on hacker forums, including a prediction that HD DVD studios would now defect to Blu-ray, since the latter format includes the extra BD+ layer of copy-protection. Yet like Dickens’ story of redemption, the studios have reason for cheer amid the grim holiday tidings. For one thing, AACS wasn’t really cracked, as that term is commonly understood. Claims to the contrary are based on limited understanding of how AACS was designed to work. For another, the compromise of a handful of titles now, while the number of discs and players in the market is still insignificant, provides a low-cost, low-risk opportunity to test how well AACS can respond to being compromised. ACCORDING TO THE DOOM9 postings, Muslix64 was using the USB-enabled HD DVD add-on for his Xbox 360 to view HD DVD discs on his PC, using Cyberlink’s PowerDVD player software. Using BackupHDDVD, he/she was apparently able to retrieve the title-specific decryption keys from the player memory during playback and then feed them into his/her own decryption procedure as outlined in the public documents available on the AACS Licensing Authority Web site. The keys themselves apparently remain encrypted, however. The basic approach with BackupHDDVD is not all that different from DeCSS, the first widely distributed crack of the CSS-encryption used on standard DVDs. Like BackupHDDVD, DeCSS works by uncovering the decryption keys and using them to create unencrypted files on a hard drive. In other important ways, however, there is a world of difference between the two scenarios, related to the designs of the respective encryption systems themselves. CSS relied on a single set of keys that were used to encrypt every DVD and were provided to every DVD player, both hardware and software. Once those keys were uncovered the first time, the system was fatally compromised. The same utility can be used to rip any DVD for all time. AACS, on the other hand, was designed specifically to cope with the challenge presented by BackupHDDVD. Both the PowerDVD player software and the titles themselves carry unique keys, which, if hacked, can be revoked. In principle, the damage can be limited to only those copies of Full Metal Jacket and the others currently in the market and to the PowerDVD player. THE CHALLENGING PART will be getting the system to work as designed. And here, BackupHDDVD could be a blessing in disguise, giving the studios and software makers a chance to uncover potential bugs in the system while the numbers—and the potential damage—remain small. First, additional forensic work will have to be done to determine exactly what BackupHDDVD does, to determine exactly where the compromise occurred. If the player’s keys were indeed compromised, those keys could be “revoked,” meaning all discs pressed from that point forward would be unplayable in the cracked players. That would have the effect of revoking the players of many people who had done nothing wrong, however, and would actually shield the guilty party or parties from having their players “updated” with new keys. A more likely scenario is that the player’s existing keys would be revoked at the disc level. New copies of those titles would be replicated using new keys, so that the new discs would not play in the compromised players. Updated keys for the PowerDVD player could then be distributed via new discs so that innocent owners of PowerDVD can continue to use their players. How quickly that can all be made to happen, however, and with what degree of due-process for Cyberlink remain unclear. What procedures exist, exist only on paper and have never been tried in the real world. But the studios might as well find out now, when the damage affects only a few catalog titles and a handful of players.

AACS er ikke cracked.. Gider ikke lige læse det lange citat igennem foroven, men nej det er ikke Jon sagen der gentager sig. Det muslix64 har gjort er at han har opdaget en brist i PowerDVD 6.5 og som vi alle kender det er kæden ikke stærkere end det svageste led. Det samme gælder winDVD og sikkert også andre.. Hvad nytter det at implementere en meget stærk kryptering når programmerne til at afspille diskene med "sladrer"?! PowerDVD gemmer en kopi af AACS nøglen i RAM når disken startes op. RAMen tømmes ikke når programmet lukkes og nøglen kan ekstraheres. Men at kalde dette cracking er AACS er forkert...

HDDVDBackup som han har sendt online finder ikke selv denne nøgle den ripper bare disken når den har nøglen.

puggie skrev: AACS er ikke cracked..

Helt enig. Det er ikke cracket - men dog aligevel er svaghederne ved AACS blevet udstillet.

Læs evt. nyheden på recordere.dk der forsøger at samle de forskellige meninger.

  /Lars

In all fairness skyldes affæren tilsyneladende ikke en svaghed ved AACS, men softwareimplementeringen fra PowerDVD - sjovt nok var det via PowerDVD at CSS blev knækket på DVD mediet. Der sidder nok nogen med røde ører et eller andet sted derude og så er den vist ikke meget længere pt.

Efterspillet vil vise om AACS i praksis kan dæmme op for sådanne tilfælde, som det er designet til at skulle kunne - i modsætning til CSS. 

Man kan under alle omstændigheder rippe de titler der er på markedet nu hvilket vel er en 100-200 film. De kommende film vil med garanti ikke kunne afvikles i den version af PowerDVD. Som jeg har forstået det er det netop et af elementerne der gør AACS en smart teknologi, det at afspillere kan få blacklisted nøglerne.

Det svarer lidt til at låne naboens trådløse internet ved at opsnappe nøglen, det virker indtil naboen ændrer nøglen og er derfor ikke en endelig løsning. 

Det ser lidt kritisk ud:

"Technical experts who have examined the software posted by Muslix64 said that it was only a partial solution for making copies of the digitally protected material, but that it did not bode well for the Advanced Access Content System.

“They’re playing with something that is incomplete, but it is still a troubling sign,” said Richard Doherty, the president of Envisioneering, a consumer electronics industry consulting firm. "

Og et andet stort potentielt problem for HD-DVD:

"If the person who identified himself as Muslix64 is able to create a complete version of a decryption program, or if others extend the software so that consumers without technical expertise can readily make copies of movies, that would create a crisis for the HD-DVD camp. That system contains a “revocation” mechanism for shutting down HD-DVD players whose encryption system has been compromised. But industry analysts say that taking such a step would give the HD-DVD system a tremendous black eye, angering consumers and shaking the confidence of Hollywood studios in the system."

Bliver tilstrækkelige mange afspillere sat ud af funktion så softwaresalget går i stå? Næppe det de ser frem til.

Uddrag taget herfra:

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/01/technology/01hack.html?_r= 1&oref=slogin

luis figo skrev: Bliver tilstrækkelige mange afspillere sat ud af funktion så softwaresalget går i stå? Næppe det de ser frem til.

Jeg syntes ikke det ser spor sort ud. Software players kan jo bare opdateres.

Så brugere af PowerDVD får tilbudt en opdatering, og så spiller de videre. Hvis Cyberlink har været lidt smarte har de bygget den automatisk opdatering ind i programmet - så brugeren får besked om at programmet kræver en update for at spille den nye film.

Det er langt værre hvis hackere får fat i sikkerhedsnøglerne fra PSP3 eller anden hardware. De er sværere at tilbagekalde.

  /Lars

De 'nøgler' som crackeren påstår at have fremskaffet stammer ikke fra harwaren, men de enkelte HD-DVD titler.

Dvs. at fremtidige presninger af disse titler blot får en anden nøgle og kan ikke afvikles i det 'komprimitterede' miljø - dvs. PowerDVD 6.5.

Pt. er der en masse snak om at det hele måske blot er fup - ingen har kunnet eftergøre crackerens metode og han er tilsyneladende selv forsvundet op i den blå luft, så hvem ved...

Agent Cooper, det her lyder som om det ikke er fup:

"Technical experts who have examined the software posted by Muslix64 said that it was only a partial solution for making copies of the digitally protected material, but that it did not bode well for the Advanced Access Content System.

“They’re playing with something that is incomplete, but it is still a troubling sign,” said Richard Doherty, the president of Envisioneering, a consumer electronics industry consulting firm. "

Til noget andet. Det ser ud til at der kan laves backup af HD-DVD filmen. I nedenstående link beskriver en hvordan han ligger alt hvad der er på en skive ned på sin harddisk via xbox 360 drev sat til PCen. Men hvordan kan han bruge det der ligger på harddisken til noget som helst? Det kan jo ikke afspilles fra harddisken for det er ikke muligt, så den anden mulighed er at brænde det på en HD-DVD skive men det lyder for nemt, så hvordan kan han anvende det der ligger på harddisken til noget????

Link:

http://forum.videohelp.com/viewtopic.php?t=317738

Af hvad jeg selv kan konkludere er der ikke meget "back up" i at flytte filerne over på harddisken. Det eneste han gør er at optage plads til ingenting. Så længe han ikke har de nødvendige "nøgler" forbliver dataerne krypterede og ubruelige. Så det eneste han er lykkedes med er at afspille fra XBOX 360 HD-dvd drevet via PCen.

Er det ikke den billigste måde at se HD-DVD på? dvs. XBOX 360 drev via USB porten i PCen med software og så videre med HDCP "compliant" (kender kun det engelske hvad er det danske ord?) grafikkort og tv?

Ser man på filmen som personen der har dekrypteret "nøglerne" til seks forskellige film har lavet, ser det ud til at han faktisk har gjort det, så det er muligt at afspille film direkte fra harddisken. Årsagen til at jeg tror han har gjort det er slutningen af filmen. Her holder han noget over nogle oplysninger som vi ikke kan se fordi disse oplysninger er ulovlige at videregive. Kigger man på filmen omkring 1 minut og 56 sekunder dukker tallene 1, 19, 6, 1, 1, og 1 op under hinanden efterfulgt af en streg. Hvis han ikke har dekrypteret "nøglen" , som tallene efter stregen vist nok er, så skulle der bare stå en masse nuller efter stregen, men vedrørende de sidste to film kan man lige skimte noget der ikke ligner nuller. Her er filmen:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_oZGYb92isE

Iøvrigt skulle han poste noget mere idag med yderligere oplysninger.

Ingen problemer med PowerDVDs sikkerhed, personen har ikke anvendt programet til at få fat i nøglerne.

"Cyberlink Responds to Alleged AACS Crack

With the HD DVD AACS Crack/Hack that supposedly happened last week, I said that Cyberlink would most likely issue some additional information on the matter.  I just got an e-mail from the people at Cyberlink with some great information.  Above all, Cyberlink is sure PowerDVD's implementation of AACS fully protects HD DVD contents.

• First of all, PowerDVD complies to AACS compliance rules to ensure HD DVD contents are fully protected.  Cyberlink is confident that PowerDVD fully protects HD DVD contents.
• Secondly, PowerDVD does not keep "Title Keys" in system memory.  Cyberlink is not sure how the user got the Title Key and notes that the released tool nor the video on YouTube provides the information on obtaining the Titles Keys.
• Thirdly, there are no evidences that the user is using PowerDVD to hack/crack HD DVD video content.  He or she was simply using PowerDVD to playback the video that was ripped with other software. PowerDVD supports evo video file format playback.

Overall, it doesn’t look like AACS or Cyberlink have found any faults in PowerDVD.  So, at this point no updates will be issued for PowerDVD and the verdict is still out on whether or not additional playback software was used to obtain the Title Keys.  No one has yet to prove that the keys can be obtained through a memory dump or any other methods.

Yet again, AACS wasn’t cracked/hacked and the one piece of the puzzle for obtaining the Title Keys doesn’t appear to add up.

Thanks goes out to Cyberlink for the information."

http://msmvps.com/blogs/chrisl/archive/2007/01/02/463980.asp x

Personen har heller ikke oplyst noget yderligere som tidligere lovet skulle komme idag. Undrer mig dog over eksperternes bekymring hvis det er en løgn, og personen ikke har fået fat i nøglerne.

Så kom indlægget fra personen alligevel idag her er hvad han skriver:

"

Det ser ud til at HD-DVDs beskyttelse er hacket. Nøglen til filmen Serenity og King Kong er fundet, læs herfra og frem:

http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=119871&page=31

BluRay står formentlig for tur. Nogen kloge hoveder vil formentlig lave et program der automatisk gør tingene for dem som ikke kan finde ud af at finde nøglerne.

Det gode ved det er at de film kan afspilles fra harddisk hvilket jeg ser som udmærket. Desuden kan nogen af dem som ikke har udstyr med HDCP vel også nu se film uden at skulle opgradere TV/ Projekter.

Hvonår lærer de det? Væk med regionskoder og kopibeskyttelse og ned i pris på filmene. Sagde begge lejre ikke at omkostningerne ved HD-DVD og BluRay var på niveau med dvd? Hvorfor er priserne så høje? Mange af filmene har jeg købt en eller to gange (VHS), så lidt lavere priser er hvad jeg forventer.

Update 1: Nøglen til "12 Monkeys" er også fundet. Det ser ud til at nøglen til alle film på markedet kan findes indtil hullet lukkes! Dvs. der kan fortages kopier af de film der er på markedet og de kan spredes via BitTorrent osv. Ikke særlig heldigt hvis det sker. Skal vi som betaler for filmene betale endnu mer? HMMMMMMM.

Jeg er ikke 100% indne i det men det ser ud til at AACS ikke er brudt:

"In fact, the fact that DVDs are copyable has probably HELPED the adoption of DVD, not detered it.

Also, I should point out that Doom9 has gone to great lengths to verify that the activities on their site are LEGAL. What has happened is that these people are using an exploit of BOTH HD-DVD and BD which relies on a Volume Key to decrypt the files needed to play the disc. It does not, in fact BREAK AACS, but uses it to tell it to decrypt the file.

I, for one, have no problem with this at all. "

Kilde: http://www.avsforum.com/avs-vb/showthread.php?t=786427

Men det er muligt at lave back up på harddisk og derved kan man vel også lave en kopi som kan distribueres hvis det er nogens hensigt.